An analysis of Syria’s new leadership and the credibility of their claimed moderation
Since the jihadi massacre in Sweida in July and early August and the genocidal mass killings of Alawites and Christians before that in March, the landscape of the Syrian internal conflict has shifted. The post-Assad attempt to stabilize the country shifted to dealing with a regime that shows in practice that it has not renounced the murderous ideology inherited from the al-Qaida/Jabhat al-Nusra eras. The rebrand of the ruling Hayat Tahrir al-Sham faction, formerly called Jabhat al-Nusra, should be treated with skepticism.
The U.S. and the international community has choices to make. They will have to reconcile praising Syria’s President Ahmad Shara’a, formerly known by the al-Qaida jihadist nomme de guerre Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, even though his forces committed terror massacres inspired by the same ideology that caused the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) accused Syria’s new Defense Ministry of covering up its involvement in the executions of Druze civilians. “The killers are armed men affiliated with the Ministry of Defense, and this is one of the crimes of field executions,” Rami Abdulrahman, who heads SOHR, said. In at least one video posted on X, a jihadist commander openly claimed to represent al-Qaida and ISIS in Syria. Syrian Druze see no distinction between them and the new Syrian state.
Observation of ISIS insignia on the uniforms of fighters connected with the HTS-led Syrian government attacking Druze on social media in the southern area of Sweida provided visual evidence of the jihadist orientation. This reinforces the perception that the government in Damascus has merely expanded jihadist governance of the Idlib province to the entire country.
Shara’a’s past comments further call the credibility and the sincerity of his claimed moderation into question. Shara’a vowed in a decade-old interview to never deviate from his interpretation of Islamic law and that any seeming variances would not be according to Western or American political norms, but in accord with pragmatic tactical concerns. An Arab diplomat consulted by this writer who met Shara’a earlier this year noted that he was pragmatic in his approach. “…We fight to govern the Earth by Islamic law and this will never change as long as we live, because it is among our constants. As for tactical matters (like battles), they change based on circumstances. These are variables we adjust according to reality, but the constants never change,” Shara’a said in an undated interview.
President Trump’s Syria envoy Amb. Tom Barrack believes Shara’a’s policies aren’t religiously rooted, but this requires ignoring the Syrian president’s past statements and recent actions. But concealment of intentions and even pragmatism is a common Salafi-jihadi tactic. Shara’a led HTS while it still was connected with al-Qaida under the name Jabhat al-Nusra. Al-Qaida literature is replete with references to a concept called al-Harb Khida’ that calls for tactical flexibility. Shara’a’s interview echoes the words of late al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri’s from his 2001 manifesto “Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner” in which he states “Concealing intentions from the enemy is one of the greatest means of victory, for the infidels should not know our plans until we launch a surprise attack that shatters their strength.”
Similarly, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) leader Sheikh Abu Musab Abdul Wadud, real name Abdelmalek Droukdel, said in a 2005 video titled “Message to Our Ummah in the Islamic Maghreb,” to convey the same message, “Do not reveal your plans to the enemy, but keep your movements secret until the time of the strike, for concealing intentions is the key to victory in our jihad.” His group stated when it rebranded from Jabhat al-Nusra to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in 2016, “We perform jihad for the sake of establishing governorship of Islamic law until between Islam and other religions disappear and Islam becomes supreme over the Earth.”
Shara’a’s new government agreed in March to keep Islamic law as the basis of Syrian governance for the next five years. Syria’s HTS Justice Minister Shadi al-Waisi was seen on video in 2015 overseeing the execution of two women for adultery while he still belonged to al-Qaida.
Such sentiments fuel concern that Shara’a and HTS are not being honest to the world about their true intentions. Religiously motivated violence against Christians, Druze, and Alawites fuels those worries as well as the desire by the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to keep its arms.
Under HTS rule, Alawites along Syria’s western coast have also been massacred; Christians have been threatened or killed; and Shiites have been persecuted. Sectarianism reigns. Social media posts show individuals associated with HTS raising a jihadist banner over a Shia shrine in Aleppo. Other insults against the Shia have been reported.
The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) that has been integrated into the new Syrian Defense Ministry ethnically cleansed Afrin in northwestern Syria of Kurds starting in 2018. Its integration has raised the ire of critics due to the jihadist orientation of its fighters. The elevation of individuals such as Ahmad al-Hayes, a brigadier general in the Ahrar al-Sharqiya jihadist militia in the new Defense Ministry, stands as a reminder that the new Syria is a jihadist state. The U.S. sanctioned al-Hayes in 2021 on account of his having allegedly trafficked Yazidi women and integrated ISIS fighters into his militia.
A 2021 report by the Kurdish-supported Rojava Information Center noted that Turkish intelligence officers occupied key positions in the SNA. Prior to integration, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Ahrar al-Sharqiya in 2021 for numerous crimes against Syrian Kurds including war crimes such as summary executions, abductions, torture, and private-property seizures. It also looted Christian churches and homes. The Treasury Department noted that Ahrar al-Sharqiya incorporated many former ISIS fighters. The United Nations called the summary execution of female Kurdish politician Hevrin Khalaf in 2019 a war crime and called on Turkey to investigate. Ahrar al-Sharqiya participated in war crimes against Alawites in March.
HTS appointed Abu Hatim Shaqra as commander of the 86th Division of the new Syrian Army, overseeing Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Hasakah despite his direct involvement in Khalaf’s murder.
This integration stands as a reminder that past involvement in ISIS is not a disqualifier for membership in Shara’a’s Syrian Army.
Other jihadist militias that have joined the new army include Xhemati Alban, a jihadist sniper squad made up of Albanian foreign fighters. Its leader Abu Qatada al-Albani (Abdul Jashari), who now holds the rank of colonel, was previously designated terrorist by the U.S. government in 2016. It engaged in a propaganda effort aimed at radicalizing Muslims in the Balkans to fight in Syria. Ahmed Rizaq, a leader of the Noureddine el-Zenki Movement jihadist group that was involved in war crimes including beheading a boy and torturing journalists, was granted the rank of colonel in the new army.
Unit 400, a special forces unit of HTS fighters linked with the new Damascus, is responsible for slaughtering 1,500 Alawites near Latakia and Tartous in March, and destroying Alawite shrines and the ripping out the heart of an Alawite man and placing it on his chest. Jihadists have been previously shown engaging in extreme barbarity such as in 2013 when a jihadist was shown eating the heart of a government soldier. A Reuters report found evidence of a direct chain of command leading to Damascus.
Shara’a’s public relations offensive cannot remove the clear evidence that the new Syrian army and state retain a clear jihadist orientation; consequently, its normalization is premature and could enable the global travel and movement of jihadists. Shara’a’s terrorists also killed Druze while he belonged to al-Qaida, so the more things change the more they stay the same.