The recent Syrian stance has ended the debate over Berlin and the European Union’s hopes of addressing the refugee file through diplomatic channels. In a direct response, Syrian Foreign Minister Assad al-Shibani announced the Damascus authorities’ rejection of German government plans to repatriate 700,000 Syrian refugees, labeling the proposal as “forced deportation.” This refusal puts an end to the bets made by European capitals since December 2025, when they rushed to legitimize the authority of “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” immediately after it seized power.
Context of European Understandings with the “Nusra” Government
In recent months, European diplomacy has relied on a pragmatic hypothesis; the EU and Berlin blessed the authority of “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” in Damascus, hoping to find a security partner that would facilitate the return of hundreds of thousands of Syrian migrants. The European bet was based on the premise that the “Nusra government,” seeking international recognition, would accept making demographic concessions to relieve Europe of the burdens of this file. However, these calculations ignored the ideological and geopolitical nature of the group, which manages the migrant file according to strategies that transcend traditional state frameworks.
Dr. Walid Phares’ Perspective: A Strategy of Expansion, Not Return
Dr. Walid Phares’ analysis indicates that Syrian demographic movements since 2015 were not incidental; rather, they were part of a precise engineering of organized networks that have spread deep into the European interior. Based on this reading, “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” does not treat the “organizational networks” entrenched among the migrants as Syrian citizens it should work to repatriate, but rather considers them an organic and ideological extension of the group’s own structure; they are an integral part of its entity and political project present beyond its borders.
According to Phares, the political legitimization granted by Europe to this authority provided it with international cover that it did not use to facilitate return, but rather to consolidate its foreign influence. These groups, linked organizationally to the “Nusra government,” have turned into an instrument for “globalizing the intifada” within European cities. These networks act as a geopolitical arm linked to the decision-making center in Damascus, placing Europe before a complex strategic reality: Damascus rejects any path to return, not only for political motives, but to preserve this organic extension that provides it with influence at the heart of the continent—while emphasizing the fundamental distinction between these organizational networks that constitute an extension of the group and the general mass of refugees who do not represent this extension.
Repercussions of the Syrian Stance on European Security
The refusal of Foreign Minister Assad al-Shibani to meet German demands confirms that the refugee card is no longer a matter of negotiation for Damascus. For the “Nusra government,” the presence of these networks in Europe represents a security interest that guarantees it permanent influence at the heart of the continent. Thus, Berlin’s gamble has backfired; instead of the “legitimacy” offered by Europe contributing to ending the migration file, it has enhanced Damascus’s ability to manage these networks as an army that follows its jihadist agenda, with a decline in prospects for any future cooperation on repatriation.
The Post-“Alea Iacta Est” Phase
With the announcement of the Syrian position, it is clear that the path that began with the “legitimization” of the “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” government has reached a dead end. The die has been cast (Alea iacta est), and reality now forces Europe to confront the consequences of its strategy. What Berlin viewed as a solution to the migrant problem has turned into an existential crisis, as the continent now faces a jihadist regime in Damascus that refuses repatriation and insists on continuing operations and entrenching its networks deep within Europe.